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To  overcome  market  failures  society  creates  common  laws  that  stimulate  or  penalize 
individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who 
may be susceptible to corruption. Thus, a new market emerges where ‘influences’ are traded. 
Legislators  have  incentives  to  deviate  from  the  goal  of  efficiency  and  produce  laws  that 
maximize  the  gains  that  can  be  expected  from  bribes.  We  model  this  behaviour  for  an 
autocracy  versus  a  democracy,  using  a  microeconomic  framework.  We  assume  that  in an 
autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting 
groups compete in the bribes market. In order to bring about the downfall of the incumbent 
rulers, these groups inform voters of the rulers'  deviant actions so that, by a stochastic process, 
they convince voters of the existence of bribes and therefore gain their votes. The models 
constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely 
that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still 
positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher (the proxy for the 
voters’ receptivity to the efforts of the opposition), regimes are closer to democracies and the 
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1. Introduction 
Researchers have been interested in the determinants and effects of corruption for quite some 
time - Aidt (2003), Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Bardhan, (1997), and Ades and Di 
Tella  (1997)  provide  excellent  and  comprehensive  surveys  on  the  subject.  Recently,  the 
availability  of  adequate  data  corruption,  especially  indices  of  corruption  perceptions  for 
different countries, boosted new and interesting studies (Goel and Nelson, 2005; Xin and 
Rudel, 2004; Fisman and Svensson, 2002). 
Corruption,  although  unethical,  may  be  perfectly  rational  from  an  individual  frame  of 
reference (Barreto, 2000). Corruption can therefore take place in any economic transaction 
involving the public sector, since any economic transaction brings mutual benefits to both 
parties.  
Given that natural resources are a factor in production, by imposing restrictions on their use 
governments  create  economic  incentives  for  producers  to  overcome  these  restrictions.  In 
addition, economic incentives also exist for producers to adjust the production process (for 
example, through the division of labour) and the level of output. The producers therefore have 
an incentive for attempting to corrupt the government agents who control the consumption 
rate for natural resources and the level of competition. 
A government strategy which maximizes the potential for corruption involves imposing very 
strict limits on the use of natural resources and, in addition, a concentrated market. In this 
way, the value of a natural resource (its shadow price) is enhanced and comes to represent a 
greater gain when the imposed limits are overcome. It is easy for governments to justify such 
policies. In the first place, it is easy to convince the public that they should economize on 
natural resources and that policies should therefore be restrictive. Secondly, it is also easy to 
convince the public that the existence of economies of scale means that production is more 
efficient if it is in the hands of one sole producer.  
We assume that government controls the use of natural resources but this concept can be 
conceptually extended to accommodate any market regulation policy. 
Despite  having  imposed  tight  restrictions  on  the  use  of  the  natural  resource,  government 
officials can organize ways of “selling” permission to overstep these limits. For example, the 
measurements  of  the  natural  resource  used  are  not  directly  observed  by  the  public  and 
“inspectors” can alter the figures.    3
Thus,  the  enforcement  of  law  depends  on  the  actions  of  public  authorities  who  could  be 
corrupted. A new market emerges where ‘influences’ are traded. Legislators have incentives 
to deviate from the goal of efficiency and produce laws that maximize the gains that can be 
expected from bribes. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a 
microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the 
bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. 
The present paper is structured as follow. In the next section we formalize the model. In the 
Section 3, using simulation techniques, we analyse the level of social welfare that occurs 
when  a  government  imposes  a  maximum  level  of  use  for  a  natural  resource,  which  is 
distributed amongst various producers. The Section 4 details a reduced model of interaction 
between government officials and the opposition and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Formalization of the model  
In  our  economy  there  is  a  natural  resource  and  decisions  on  how  it  is  assigned  are  the 
responsibility of the government. The use of this natural resource has, on the one hand, a 
positive effect in terms of company output and, on the other hand, a negative externality for 
people. The government therefore has to make a ruling on the use of this natural resource that 
takes both the positive and the negative effects into account.  
In abstract terms, the production of goods and services requires capital, labour and the natural 
resource whose use causes environmental damage (e.g. air pollution) that has a negative effect 
on the welfare of agents.  
Since environmental damage is not taken into account in the producers'  decisions, there is a 
need for the government to intervene. Let us suppose that technology allows for the partial 
substitution of factors that may be condensed into a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
that there are increasing returns to scale. 
The  fact  that  increased  production  implies  greater  use  of  the  natural  resource  and  the 
production technology involves economies of scale enables corrupt government officials to 
convince the electorate to adopt policies that are not the best in terms of social welfare, even 
though they increase the potential gains for these individuals.  
One of these policies concerns the level of market concentration. The existence of economies 
of scale introduces the officials'  argument for the existence of a “natural monopoly" which 
favours market concentration. If we observe the situation in various different countries, it can   4
be seen that this justification has been used frequently by governments (together with the 
Schumpeterian  issue  of  appropriate  investment  in  innovation  and  development)  to  justify 
awarding concessions to just a few companies. In Portugal, for example, this argument is used 
to justify the existence of monopolies in water supply, refuse collection, rail transport, urban 
public transport and port authorities, amongst others. 
A second policy is associated with the natural resource’s consumption rate. The fact that there 
is a positive relationship between consumption of the natural resource and output emerges 
here as a justification on the part of governments for allowing a level of use of the natural 
resource that is beyond that which is socially beneficial, causing environmental damage. 
Both of these policies favour the producers who are already operating in the market and who 
therefore push for the situation to be maintained by paying bribes.  
In formal terms, let us assume that a producer using a level of capital k, labour supply l and 
amount m of the natural resource, has the output level y: 
1 , ) , , ( > + + × × × = g b a
g b a m l k A m l k y ,             (1) 
As there are economies of scale, this implies a + b + g > 1. 
Assuming that the market rate for capital is rate r, which includes depreciation and risk, that 
the hourly-paid market wage is w and that the private sector price of the natural resource is 
zero, the profits of a producer whose production function is represented by the expression (1) 
will be: 
w l r k p m l k y m l k × - × - × = ) , , ( ) , , ( p ,              (2) 
Concentrating on market structure, let us assume, still in general terms, that the aggregate 
market demand is known and decreases linearly according to price: 
b D D p p b D D / ) ( 0 0 - = ￿ × - =              (3) 
Thus the selling price of the product depends on aggregate output. 
Assuming, additionally, that the producers compete according to Cournot, it follows that the 
profits of a producer who assumes D
+ as a reference, this being the level of output of the other 
producers, will be expressed as follows:  
w l r k b y D D y × - × - - - × =
+ / ) ( 0 p                (4)   5
The level of activity of each producer will depend on the price of the factors they use, the 
level  of  aggregate  production  amongst  the  other  producers,  D
+,  which  is  assumed  to  be 
exogenous, and the total amount of the natural resource that the government allows them to 
use. 
Presuming that each unit of the natural resource consumed causes the environmental damage 
Pa, that the wages received by employees is equal to the effort expended (i.e. working does 
not  lead  to  a  direct  increase  in  employee welfare, only in the consumption of goods and 
services) and that the capital is “foreign” (taxes do not lead to any increase in social welfare 
because  they  represent  remuneration  for  the  sacrifice  of  saving),  in  overall  social  terms 
welfare is expressed by the sum of the producer' s profit added to the consumer gains, from 
which the environmental damage is subtracted: 




i i i i × - × - × + = ￿ ￿ = = 1 0 1 ) / ( 5 , 0 ) , , (          (5) 
If we take into consideration the fact of the market economy and the fact that producers, even 
in a monopoly, have little influence on the labour and capital market, we can assume that 
capital remuneration, r, the hourly-paid wages, w, and the unitary environmental damage, Pa, 
are  exogenous  factors.  Note  that  any  discussion  on  the  level  of  efficiency/inefficiency  of 
public planning in terms of the production of goods and services lies beyond the scope of this 
study. 
In this context, the agents aspire to a government which imposes the simplest possible laws in 
order to allow producers to maximize the aggregate benefits defined in equation (5).  
As scale economies operate in the production process, if the size of a producer increases, 
fewer resources will be needed for each output unit produced. Therefore, if concessions for 
the use of the natural resource are granted to various producers with the eventual possibility 
of mergers or the acquisition of rights to the natural resource, the market will tend towards a 
monopoly  structure.  Government  officials  take  advantage  of  this  situation  to  justify  the 
existence  of  one  sole  producer  in  the  market,  an  argument  that  is  easily  accepted  by  the 
electorate. 
However, the lack of competition in the market is socially harmful since the monopolist will 
set  a  level  of  output  whose  marginal  production  costs  are  higher  than  the  market  price. 
Regulation apparently allows this problem to be overcome but, on the one hand, it attracts   6
corruption and, on the other hand, it requires the regulator to have previous knowledge of the 
most socially beneficial performance.  
3. Simulation of market behaviour 
In this section, using simulation techniques we will analyse the level of social welfare that 
occurs when a government imposes a maximum level of use for a natural resource, which is 
distributed amongst various producers. These compete but cannot merge (i.e. the government 
controls the level of market concentration). 
Starting with equations (1)-(5) and setting the model to 5 , 0 = = = g b a , D0 = 100, b = 10, r = 
15% e w =10, we see a rise in social welfare when the situation changes from a monopoly to a 
duopoly (n=1 para n=2). As can be seen in Figure 1, this is accompanied by the use of larger 













Figure 1: Relationship between the level of social welfare, number of producers and use of the 
natural resource 
However, it is possible to see from the same figure that even if the consumption level for the 
natural resource remains steady (i.e. veers from the vertical), the transition from monopoly to 
duopoly increases social welfare. This is due to the fact that even though there is no increase 
in the consumption of the natural resource, there will be an increase in production through the 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the use of labour and capital, number of producers and use of 
the natural resource 
It is possible to observe from Figure 1 that, with a given number of producers in the market, 
there is an optimum level for consumption of the natural resource. Restricting ourselves to 
these optimum points, in Figure 3 we can see the evolution of social welfare according to the 
number of producers operating in the market. In concrete terms, the existence of a certain 
amount of competition favours social welfare. In our simulation, the evolution of the level of 
welfare together with the number of producers reaches a maximum at n = 2. At up to n =10, 
social welfare is higher than in a monopoly (n=1). However, the existence of economies of 
scale in the production process means that the number of competitors has to be limited (n£10) 
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Figure 3: Relationship between social welfare and number of producers 
Another important issue that our model enables us to analyse is whether, as an alternative to 
maintaining a fixed level for the use of the natural resource, it would be in society' s interests 
for the government to set a price for the use of the natural resource (internalise the impact)   8
and to use this money to compensate for the environmental damage caused, whilst making the 
agents responsible for setting the criteria for the amount used. In this case, the cost of the 
natural factor has to be added to the profit function: 
pa m w l r k b y D D y × - × - × - - - × =
+ / ) ( 0 p             (6) 
In the simulation it can be seen that when social damage is incorporated into the optimization 
model for agents, consumption of the natural resource falls slightly and is partially replaced 
by labour and capital. However, in terms of social welfare, the policies are identical. 
To conclude, the best policy for a government is to set reasonable limits on the levels of use 
of the natural resource and to distribute the rights to more than one producer (at least two but 
less than ten, in the case of our settings), or else to set the price of the natural resource as 
environmental damage and let the producers decide on the best ratios for labour, capital and 
natural resource. However, the producers must not be allowed to merge towards monopoly or 
create a cartel.  
Given the theoretical equivalence of the two policies (imposing either a maximum level of use 
or a price), in empirical terms it is to be expected that approximately 50% of governments 
would opt for each of them. However, the vast majority of governments (and in the case of 
some resources, all of them) opt to limit use. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that putting 
a price on use reduces the potential gains for corrupt government officials. 
From this micro-foundation model we illustrate how a policy which favours the existence of 
corruption is unfavourable to social welfare. This being the case, in a second step we may, in 
abstract terms, condense possible government policies into the variable c which has the value 
of 1 if the policy is optimum and 0 if it promotes the highest possible levels of corruption and 
lower levels of social welfare. 
4. Reduced model of interaction between government officials and the opposition 
In this reduced model, the gains of government officials during the present period, B, are 
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If the government policy veers away from the optimum (i.e. if the value of c veers from 1), 
the likelihood of the government being replaced by the opposition increases. This happens 
because the public reacts to the reduced level of welfare in relation to its optimum level WF*, 
increasing  the  probability  of  the  government  falling  as  the  distance  between  WF*  –  WF 
increases. 
As  the  optimum  value  is  difficult  to  observe  (the  information  is  not  fully  accurate),  the 
likelihood of a government defeat also increases in line with the level of political activity on 
the part of the opposition (measured by the parameter y) and the receptivity of the public to 
opposition activities (measured by the parameter x). This receptivity, in empirical terms, may 
be  measured  by  the  average  level  of  education  of  the  electorate,  since  a  more  educated 
electorate tends to be able to understand and discern the relevant information better than a less 
educated  one  (Gibbons  and  Johnston,  1974).  As  Welch  (1970:  42)  argues,  “…  increased 
education may enhance a [person]’s ability to acquire and decode information about costs and 
… characteristics of other inputs.”  
The opposition incurs costs in informing the electorate (e.g. pamphlets, announcements and 
speeches) which are derived from the unit price of creating opposition, po, multiplied by the 
amount of opposition realized, po×y.  
The government determines the value of c which maximizes its expected gains, VG, with x, y 
and  po  given,  whilst  the  opposition  determines  the  level  of  political  activity  y  which 
maximizes its expected gains, VO, with x, c and po given (assuming that the government does 
not influence po).  
In this way, the expected gains from being in power, VG, and from being in opposition, VO, 
are shown in the resolution of the following dynamic optimization problem: 
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This represents a symmetry in which all the agents (government and opposition) adopt the 
same strategy – for the government, the policy is represented by c and for the opposition, y.  
Therefore, the level of good governance (as opposed to the level of corruption) will result 
from  the  interaction  between  the  government  and  the  opposition  in  a  similar  way  to  the 
competition that takes place between companies to win market leadership. 
From  the  results  shown  below,  the  model  demonstrates  that  the  level  of  corruption  in  a 
democracy is lower than in an autocracy and is very much dependent on the ability of the 
opposition groups to captivate the electorate. 
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In an analysis of comparative statics,  : , 0 1 0 1 y y y c c c = = = =  
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the first optimization condition can be derived: 
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This demonstrates that when the price of creating opposition, po, is infinite we are faced with 
a strong dictatorship and when po is reduced, the level of democracy rises. 
When po is infinite, the government adopts the most corrupt policy possible. In the second 
equation the level of opposition activity is zero: 
[ ] [ ] 0 , 0 , 0 = = = ￿ ¥ = ￿ ¥ = × + × × VO f f f VG f VG y b y y y          (13) 
meaning  that  the  government  remains  in  power  regardless  of  its  politics  and  government 
officials adopt whatever maximizes their level of corruption: 
[ ] 0 0 0 0 = ￿ = × + × × - = c b y c c f VO B                (14) 
When the price of creating opposition, po, is zero, we are faced with a "perfect" democracy 
and the government adopts a form of politics that only contains a certain level of corruption 
(no  government  is  incorruptible).  In  the  second  equation,  there  is  a  positive  level  of 
opposition which makes it likely that the government will change and that it is worth creating 
an opposition. 





f VG f VG y b
y y
y y      (15) 
Note  that,  if  taken  to  absurd  lengths,  the  level  of  opposition  would  be  infinite  and  the 
government would fall immediately, thus implying that there are no gains for government 
officials. Therefore it would not be worth forming an opposition, since there would be no 
gains to be had from forming a government. If the government implements optimum policies, 
the government officials remain in power but still gain nothing, as there are no incentives to 
form any opposition. However, if the opposition is finite, the likelihood of the government 
officials who have maintained a certain level of corruption losing office is lower when the 
units representing the gains to be had from remaining in office and the gains to be had from 
creating an opposition are positive. 
From  these  two  limited  cases,  it  may  be  concluded  that  when  the  cost  of  forming  an 
opposition  is  lower,  the  level  of  opposition  is  greater,  as  are  the  chances  of  government 
officials being removed from office and their level of corruption being reduced. 
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Note  that  if  the  costs  of  creating  an  opposition  are  subsidized,  there  are  no  longer  any 
incentives to form a government and government officials no longer concern themselves with 
re-election, thus increasing the level of corruption. In addition, it may also be concluded that 
when the level of “education” of a population, as reflected in the parameter x, is higher, the 
level  of  opposition  and  of  government  corruption  will  be  lower.  In  this  sense,  formal 
education may be seen here as a means of tempering the discrepancy between the actual levels 
of corruption in particular countries in relation to the optimum levels (Dewey, 1985 [1916]; 
Parker, 2003). Perversely, it may also justify a lack of investment, on the part of dictatorships, 
in policies to promote levels of human capital in their respective populations, as was the case 
with the Salazar regime in Portugal (Carreira, 1996). 
5. Conclusion 
Corruption tends to be a factor in economic inefficiency, since the economic incentives for 
corruption only exist when governments do not commit themselves to optimum policies.  
In our work, we have aimed to study, in theoretical terms, the implications of the existence of 
opposition to a government (i.e. a democracy) in relation to the corruption of government 
officials  and  the  social  welfare  of  a  nation.  To  this  end,  we  have  constructed  a  dynamic 
theoretical  model  in  which  two  groups  alternate  between  the  positions  of 
government/opposition with probability f. We assume that the probability of the government 
becoming the opposition rises in line with the level of inefficiency (corruption), the level of 
opposition activity and the level of education of the electorate.  
Using computational methods and algebraic manipulation on a reduced model, we concluded 
that  the  freedom  to  create  opposition  leads  to  a  fall  in  the  level  of  corruption  amongst 
government  officials  (and  a  rise  in  efficiency)  without,  however, totally eliminating it. In 
addition, the level of education (the human capital) of the electorate equates with a fall in the 
cost of creating opposition, thus contributing towards a reduction in the level of corruption 
and consequently a fall in the rate of economic inefficiency. 
Our results therefore appear to accord with the empirical stylized facts, namely that in less 
democratic countries people tend to be less educated (Parker, 2003), governments only loose 
power  when  there  are  very  high  levels  of  opposition  and  the  level  of  development  and 
economic  growth  tends  to  be  lower  than  in  more  "democratic"  countries  (Barro,  1991; 
Repkine,  2003),  even  though,  as  a  rule,  the  respective  government  officials  benefit  from   13
obviously higher levels of welfare and wealth than the majority of the rest of the population, 
as well as officials in the more democratic countries (Barro, 1994). 
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